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INTRODUCTION
The STS-35 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report contains a summary of the
vehicle subsystem activities during this thirty-eighth flight of the Space
Shuttle and the tenth flight of the Orbiter vehicle Columbia (OV-102). In
addition to the Columbia vehicle, the flight vehicle consisted of an External
Tank (ET) (designated at ET-35/LVr-28), three Space Shuttle main engines
(SSME's) (serial numbers 2024, 2012, and 2028 in positions 1, 2, and 3,
respectively), and two Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB's) designated as BI-038.
The primary objectives of this flight were to successfully perform the planned
operations of the Ultraviolet Astronomy (Astro-1) payload and the Broad-Band
X-Ray Telescope (BBXRT) payload in a 190-nmi. circular orbit which had an
inclination of 28.45 degrees.
The sequence of events for this mission is shown in table I. The report also
summarizes the significant problems that occurred in the Orbiter subsystems
during the mission, and the official problem tracking llst is presented in table
II. In addition, each Orbiter subsystem problem is cited in the applicable
subsystem discussion within the body of the report.
The crew for this thirty-eighth flight of the Space Shuttle was Vance D. Brand,
_-_ Commander; Guy S. Gardner, Colonel, USAF, Pilot; Jeffrey A. Hoffman, Ph.D,
Mission Specialist I; John M. Lounge, Mission Specialist 2; Robert A. Parker,
Ph.D, Mission Specialist 3; and Samuel T. Durrance, Ph.D, and Ronald A. Parise,
Ph.D., Payload Specialists. This was the third Shuttle flight for the Commander
and Mission Specialist 2; the second Shuttle flight for the Pilot, Mission
Specialist i, and Mission Specialist 3; and the first Shuttle flight for both
payload specialists.
SUMMARY
Prior to this successful launch, the STS-35 mission had been delayed for an
extended period because of an unusually high concentration of hydrogen that was
detected in the area of the Orbiter/ET disconnect and the Orbiter aft
compartment during the propellant loading that was conducted in May 1990. A
discussion of the various tanking tests is provided later in this report.
The STS-35 mission was successfully launched on the planned 10-day mission from
launch pad 39B at 336:06:49:01.0218 G.m.t. (01:49:01.0218 a.m.e.s.t.,
December 2, 1990), and all subsystems operated satisfactorily during the ascent
phase. Resumption of the countdown after the scheduled T-9 minute hold was
delayed because of a possible violation of a range safety launch commit criteria
(LCC), which requires a minimum ceiling of 8000 ft for launch area optical
coverage and to aid launch-area radar acquisition. Conditions improved, the
countdown proceeded and the launch was nominal in all respects with main engine
cutoff occurring at 336:06:57:31G.m.t. A direct insertion trajectory was
flown, thus no orbital maneuvering subsystem (OMS-I) maneuver was required or
performed.
Examinationof data from all elementsindicatesthat all ET and SSME systems,as
well as the main propulsionsystem,operatednominallyduring the ascentphase,
and all launchphase objectiveswere met. Two anomalieshave been identifiedin
the SRB analysis,neitherof which impactedthe mission. Analysis of vehicle
accelerationand preflightpropulsionpredictiondata shows that the average
flight-derivedengine specificimpulsedeterminedfor the time periodbetween
SRB separationand the start of 3g throttlingwas 453.4 secondsas comparedto
the fleet-averagetag value of 452.51 seconds.
The dual-engine OMS-2 maneuver was performed as planned at 336:07:29:25.8 G.m.t.
The maneuver was 179.6 seconds in duration with a differential velocity of
279.1 ft/sec being imparted to the vehicle. The Orbiter was placed in a 190 by
188 nmi. orbit.
At 336:16:39G.m.t, the Spacelabdata displaysystem (DDS) I, which was used in
conjuctionwith the Astro 1 and BBXRT payloads, appeared to performan
automaticshutoff. The input currentexceeded1 A for 9 secondsbefore the
shutoff. At the time of the failure,the crew reporteda burningodor that went
away after the DDS was shut down. Payloadoperationsthen continuedusing
DDS 2. At 340:12:08G.m.t.,DDS 2 also experiencedan automaticshutdownthat
was similar to the automaticshutdownon DDS 1 earlierin the mission. The crew
also reporteda burningodor, althoughno smoke was detectedby the smoke
detector. An attemptwas made to repowerDDS I. Ac bus power was applied to
DDS 1 and the currentshowed a 0.7 A per phase ramp increaseover a periodof
about 1 1/2 minutesuntil automaticsystemshutdown. The crew reporteda
burningodor believedto be caused by burned electroniccomponents. No further
attemptsto repowerDDS 1 or DDS 2 were made. The DDS failuresnecessitated
ground commandingof the experimentsfor the remainderof the mission.
At about 337:00:57 G.m.t., the ground controllers reported that the manual
pointing control (MPC) mode was toggling among on, standby, and off. The
symptom cleared when the MPC SELECT switch was switched from 2 to I. The
problem was caused by a discrepancy between the crew checklist and the actual
wiring on the vehicle. This problem did not impact the mission.
The textand graphicssystem (TAGS)jammedat 336:15:22G.m.t., and again at
337:12:21G.m.t. The crew performedthe malfunctionproceduresuccessfullyto
restorenominaloperationafter these two paper jams. At approximately
339:13:15G.m.t., the crew reportedthat the TAGS had jammed for the third time
thismission. Attempts to repair the TAGS were discontinued,and further
messageswere uplinkedusing the teleprinter. This problemdid not impact the
mission.
The reaction control subsystem (RCS) vernier thruster RSD failed off at
339:19:03:16 G.m.t., because of erratic chamber pressure. Analysis of chamber
pressure data from the firing indicated that the low chamber pressure was the
result of helium ingestion into the thruster. The thruster was reselected and
fired for a series of five longer-than-normal pulses. A decrease in the
characteristic roughness of the chamber pressure trace was evident during these
firings, and the last two firings were completely normal. The thruster
performed nominally for the remainder of the mission, and this problem did not
impactthemission.
The waste water dump rates degraded throughout the flight. The dump rate
decreased from 1.73 to 1.35 to 1.2 percent/minute for the first three waste
water dumps, respectively. A fourth waste water dump, initiated at
approximately 342:11:24 G.m.t., showed a dump rate of 1.0 percent/minute during
the first dump cycle and for the second dump cycle the rate dropped to 0.26
percent/minute at which time the dump was terminated. A cabin air purge of the
waste-water dump line through the contingency cross-tie quick disconnect was
initiated using the vacuum wand. The line was purged, and the crew reported
observing gray particles coming from the dump nozzle, but a check by the crew
showed that air flow at the vacuum wand end appeared negligible after the purge.
The data indicate that the dump valve or nozzle area was blocked.
Flight control system (FCS) checkout was completed at 343:04:25:43.02 G.m.t.
Auxiliary power unit (APU) 2 operated for 5 minutes 54 seconds and consumed
14 lb of propellant during FCS checkout. The APU 2 gas-generator bed
temperature responded slowly, requiring 50 seconds to go off-scale versus 12 to
15 seconds nominally. APU 2 functioned nominally. No water spray cooling was
required. The RCS hot-fire test was performed with no anomalies noted.
Because weather forecasts indicated unacceptable conditions at the primary
landing site on days 10 through 12 of the mission, a decision was made to end
the mission one day earlier than planned.
After completion of all entry preparations including stowage and payload-bay
door closure, the OMSdeorbit maneuver was performed at 345:04:48:31.1G.m.t.,
with a firing duration of 230.9 seconds and a differential velocity of
383.2 ft/sec. Entry interface occurred at 345:05:23:07 G.m.t.
A failure of the central ground computer which processes data from the Tracking
and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) network caused the loss of forward and return
communications through the TDRS for approximately 16 minutes during entry.
Main landing gear touchdown occurred at 345:05:54:08 G.m.t. on concrete
runway 22 at Edwards Air Force Base, CA. Nose landing gear touchdown occurred
approximately 12 seconds later with wheels stop at 345:05:55:07 G.m.t. The
rollout was normal in all respects. The three APU's were shut down by
345:06:09:20.5 G.m.t., and the crew completed the required postflight
reconfigurations and exited the vehicle at 345:07:40:05 G.m.t.
The Astro-1 payload, consisting of three ultraviolet astronomy experiments
(Ultraviolet Imaging Telescope, Wisconsin Ultraviolet Photo-polarimeter, and
Hopkins Ultraviolet Telescope), as well as the BBXRTperformed well during the
STS-35 mission. However, the failure of both Spacelab data display systems
required the implementation of a backup procedure whereby the Mission Control
Center (MCC) commanded the inertial pointing system to coarse point to the
targets. The crew would then use the manual pointing controller to fine-point
the instruments. A total of 200 observations of 130 targets was made from the
combined payload and this represents about 70 percent of the preflight
objectives. In addition, several operations and observations were completed
using the three middeck experiments (Air Force Haui Optical Site Calibration
Tests, Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment, and Ultraviolet Plume Instrument).
Ten of the scheduled 13 development test objectives (DTO's) and all of the
detailed supplementary objectives (DSOrs) were accomplished. DTO 901 (OEX
Shuttle Infrared Leeside Temperature Sensing) was not successfully completed
because of data collection difficulties. DTOts 517 (Hot Nosewheel Steering
Runway Evaluation) and 805 (Crosswind Landing Performance) were not completed
during the landing phase because the landing was to be made during darkness and
crosswinds were not at the level required by the DTOts.
SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS TANKINGS/TESTS OF STS-35 VEHICLE
On May 29, 1990, during propellant loading operations in preparation for the
planned launch of STS-35 on May 30, 1990, a hydrogen leak was detected in the
region of the 17-inch disconnect and/or the Orbiter aft compartment. Leak
detectors (LD54/LD55) in the vicinity of the disconnect and the aft-fuselage
hydrogen-detection system sensed gaseous hydrogen concentration levels that
exceeded the maximum allowable limits. As a result of these excessive levels,
the launch was scrubbed until the source of the leak could be identified and
repaired. Subsequent ambient helium leak tests were performed on the launch
pad, but no leak was found. On June 6, 1990, after the completion of
engineering analyses, a follow-on tanking test was conducted. The tanking test
confirmed the magnitude of the leak and identified the leak source to be in the
region of the disconnect. The vehicle was subsequently rolled back to the
Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) where it was demated and all of the hardware
that was suspected of leaking was removed and shipped to the contractor at
Downey, CA, for detailed testing.
All of the liquid hydrogen interface hardware that could potentially be a leak
source was subsequently replaced; the Orbiter side was replaced with the new
disconnect hardware from the Orbiter "Endeavour" (OV-105) which is under
construction at Palmdale, CA, and the ET side was replaced with a 17-inch
disconnect (serial no. 6813) that was supplied by the Orbiter and GFE Projects
Office. Several other potential leak sources within the Orbiter aft compartment
were also repaired.
A launch countdown for a planned lift-off on September I, 1990, was initiated on
August 29; however, the broad-band X-ray telescope encountered a communications
problem that caused the countdown to be terminated prior to the initiation of
propellant loading (August 30, 1990). The launch attempt was delayed while the
avionics package within the payload was replaced.
On September 5, 1990, all aspects of the launch countdown proceeded without
incident until the start of liquid hydrogen fast fill. Shortly after the start
of fast fill, sensors located in the Orbiter aft compartment again detected an
unacceptable concentration of hydrogen (>6500 ppm compared to an LCC limit of
4
600 ppm), and the launch attempt was again scrubbed. Approximately 6 hours of
isolation tests were conducted after the scrub in an attempt to pinpoint the
specific sources of the leaks before the propellants were fully drained from the
vehicle. Results of these tests indicated that the following conditions
existed:
a. No evidence of hydrogen leakage was found in the area of the 17-inch
or 4-inch disconnects;
b. The existingleak was in or near the Orbiterrecirculation-pump
packageinlet and/or the manifold-to-reclrculatlonpump-inlet
flange,which is inside the Orbiteraft compartment.
Another recirculation pump package was located, installed and tested. During
inspection of the recirculation pump package that was removed, two small nicks
were found on the 3-inch sealing surface of pump number 3.
Another suspected area of potential leakage within the aft compartment was at
the engine prevalves (PV4, PV5, and PV6). Leak checks and inspections of the
engine prevalves were performed. Engine prevalve PV6 was found to have a
damaged seal on the detent cover.
The subsequent STS-35 launch attempt on September 17, 1990, failed when the leak
detectors sensed aft compartment hydrogen concentration levels in excess of
6700 ppm. Further inspection of the PV6 prevalve revealed that the reinstalled
seal on the detent was crushed again. The inspection also revealed scratches on
the detent cover seal of the PV5 prevalve.
After this third scrub of STS-35, a special "Leak Team" was formed to locate and
fix the leaks. Many leak tests were performed under the direction of this team,
and the entire liquid hydrogen system on OV-102 was retorqued. In addition, the
detent seals on the PV5 and PV6 valves were again replaced. The repairs were
followed by a tanking test on October 30, 1990, that proved that the liquid
hydrogen system in the aft compartment of OV-102 did not leak in excess of the
LCC limits.
Data from the launch countdown, which subsequently supported the successful
flight on December 2, did not show any significant concentration levels of
gaseous hydrogen.
VEHICLE PERFORMANCE
The Vehicle Performance section of this report contains a discussion of the
operation of each element (SRB's, ET, SSME's, and Orbiter).
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS/REDESIGNED SOLID ROCKET MOTORS
All SRB systems performed as expected. The SRB prelaunch countdown was normal,
The redesigned solid rocket motor (RSRM) propulsion performance was well within
the required specification limits, and the propellant burn rate for each RSRH
was normal. RSRM thrust differentials during the build-up, steady state, and
tailoff phases were well within specifications. All SRB thrust vector control
prelaunch conditions and flight performance requirements were met with ample
margins. All electrical functions were performed properly. Also, no SRB LCC,
RSRH LCC, or Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specification Document
(OHRSD) violations occurred during the countdown.
Power-up of all igniter and field joint heaters was accomplished routinely. All
RSRH temperatures were maintained within acceptable limits throughout the
countdown. Ground purges maintained the nozzle-to-case joint and bondline
adhesive temperature within the required LCC ranges.
The SRB flight structural temperature response was as expected. Postfight
inspection of the recovered hardware indicated that the SRB thermal protection
system performed properly during ascent, with very little acreage ablation.
Postflight inspection and disassembly revealed an anomaly concerning the RSRH.
The virgin carbon cloth phenolic (CCP) on the left RSRM nozzle joint 3 was
affected by heat as far back as approximately 1 inch radially past the char
line. Soot reached the primary o-ring approximately 12 inches circumferentially
in both directions from the 195° location. There was no blow-by erosion or heat
effect to the primary o-ring at 195° or any other location. No metal components
were heat affected. No flight or static test nozzle joints have exhibited
primary o-ring heat effect, erosion, or blow-by. This is the first occurrence
of heat-affected virgin CCP in joint 3; however, heat effect has been noted in
joint 2 of one flight RSRM and two ground-test RSRH's with no o-ring heat
effects. Gas paths and soot in nozzle joints are within the experience base of
26 flights and seven static test nozzles.
Separation subsystem performance was normal for the SRB's with all booster
separation motors expended and all separation bolts severed. Separation of the
SRB occurred 126 seconds after lift-off, about 1.7 seconds later than planned
and all recovery systems performed as designed, except the right SRB main
parachutes did not disconnect at water impact. The three main parachutes were
found draped over the booster and required disconnection before removal.
Troubleshooting of the parachute release circuitry isolated the failure to a
wide-band signal conditioner in that circuit. Both SRB's were recovered and
returned to Kennedy Space Center for disassembly and refurbishment.
EXTERNAL TANK
All objectives and requirements associated with the ET propellant loading and
flight operations were met. The operation of the ET heaters and purges was
monitored and all performed satisfactorily. The Ice/Frost "Red Team" reported
that no anomalous thermal protection system conditions existed on the ET, except
that a two-foot long by i/4-inch wide vertical crack existed in the intertank
thermal protection system material. This crack started at the liquid hydrogen-
tank intertank interface and ran in a valley of the intertank stringer below the
ground umbilical carrier plate, near the -Y thrust panel. KSC documentation had
dispositioned this crack as acceptable for flight in the as-is condition. No
LCC or OHRSD violations were identified.
As expected, only the normal ice/frost formations for the December environment
were observed during the countdown. No ice or frost existed on the acreage
areas of the ET. Normal quantities of ice and frost were present on the liquid
oxygen and liquid hydrogen feedlines and on the pressurization line brackets.
Frost was also present on the liquid hydrogen protruding air load (PAL) ramps.
All of the ice and frost observations were acceptable in accordance with Space
Shuttle documentation.
ET flight performance was excellent. All electrical and instrumentation
equipment functioned properly throughout the countdown and flight. The ET
pressurization system functioned properly throughout engine start and flight.
The minimum liquid oxygen ullage pressure experienced during the period of the
ullage pressureslump was 14.7 psld.
The ET tumblesystemwas inactivefor this flight. ET separationwas nominal,
the ET did not tumble,and the ET entry and breakupoccurredwithin the
predictedfootprint.
No significantproblemswere identified;however,one In-fllghtanomalywas
identifiedafter the flightwhen the photographsof the ET, taken by the crew,
revealedi0 circulardivots on the intertank-to-hydrogenflange. The largest
six divotswere 8 to I0 inches in diameter. This anomalydid not impactflight
I-- operations.
SPACE SHUTTLEMAIN ENGINE
All SSME parameterswere normal throughoutthe prelaunchcountdown,comparing
well with prelaunchparametersobservedduring previousflights. Engine-ready
was achievedat the proper time, no LCC violationswere present,and engine
start and thrustbuild-upwere normal.
Preliminaryflight data indicatethat the SSME performanceduring mainstage,
throttling,shutdownand propellantdump operationswas normal. All three
enginesstartedand operatednormally. High pressureoxidizer turbopumpand
high pressurefuel turbopumptemperaturesappearedto be well within
specificationthroughoutthe periodof engine operation. Engine dynamicdata
generallycomparedwell with previousflightand test data. All on-orbit
activitiesassociatedwith the SSME'swere accomplishedroutinely,and no
in-flightanomaliesor other problemshave been identified.
SHUTTLERANGE SAFETY SYSTEM
Shuttlerange safety system (SRSS)closed-looptestingwas completedas
scheduledduring the launch countdown. The SRSS safe and arm (S & A) devices
were armed, and all system inhibitswere turnedoff at the appropriatetimes.
All SRSS measurementsindicatedthat the system performedas expected throughout
the flight. The systemsignal strengthremainedabove the specifiedminimumof
-97 dBm throughoutpoweredflight.
Prior to SRB separation, the SRB S & A devices were safed, and SRB power was
turned off as planned. The ET system remained active until ET separation from
the Orbiter.
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMS
Main Propulsion System
The overall performance of the main propulsion system (MPS) was excellent.
Liquid hydrogen loading was performed as planned with no stop-flows or reverts.
However, one stop-flow/revert occurred during liquid oxygen chilldown when a
350 A surge shut down a Government furnished equipment (GFE) liquid oxygen pump
(A126). An alternate pump (A127) was activated with a resultant delay of
49 minutes in the loading operations. No OMRSD violations occurred during the
loading operations.
Throughout the preflight operations, no significant hydrogen hazardous gas
concentrations were detected with the maximum hydrogen level in the Orbiter aft
compartment being 140 ppm. This level was significantly lower than normally
experienced with the Columbia vehicle.
During replenish, the aft compartment helium reading reached 16,200 ppm, which
exceeded the LCC limit of I0,000 ppm. A leak was isolated to the aft
compartment hazardous gas detection system sample line disconnect, which
ingested T-O umbilical helium purge gas. Therefore, no helium leak actually
existed within the aft compartment.
A comparison of the calculated propellant loads versus the inventory loads at
the end of replenish results in a loading accuracy of -0.041 percent for liquid
hydrogen and -0.049 percent for liquid oxygen.
Ascent MPS performance was completely normal. Data indicate that the liquid
oxygen and hydrogen pressurization systems performed as planned and that all net
positive suction pressure requirements were met throughout the powered flight
phase.
The gaseous oxygen flow control valves were shimmed to a high position of
93 percent and a low position of 55 percent open as the step one fixed orifice
program was flown for the second time. The gaseous oxygen pressurization system
performed normally throughout the flight, with a minimum liquid oxygen ullage
pressure during the period of the ullage pressure slump being 14.7 psid.
Out-of-specification valve response times were noted for the liquid oxygen out-
board and liquid hydrogen inboard and outboard fill and drain valves at
vacuum-inert initiation. The 0MRSD identifies the minimum opening response
time as 2.9 seconds for each valve. The quick valve response times (2.75, 2.49,
and 2.81 seconds) are a result of the deletion of the manual anti-slam
procedure. The valves are certified under slam-operation conditions. Fast
opening times are frequently encountered at vacuum inert initiation. The OMRSD
will be modified to reflect new minimum response times. The quick response
times are not considered an in-flight anomaly.
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Propellant dump and vacuum Inertlng were accomplished satisfactorily.
Postfllght evaluation revealed three failed measurements which are all
attributed to a faulty hardware interface module card. These failures were
minor in nature and had no impact on the flight or countdown operations.
Reaction Control Subsystem
The performance of the reaction control subsystem (RCS) was nominal with two
anomalies noted. During entry, the RCS was also used to support DTO 242, which
is an entry aerodynamic control surface test. A total of 4820 ib of propellant
was used by the RCS engines, including that burned during the forward RCS dump
burn and that supplied from the OMS during crossfeed operations. The Orbital
Maneuvering Subsystem section discusses the amount of OMS fuel consumed by the
RCS during interconnect operations.
At 337:22:39 G.m.t., it was noted that the left RCS drain panel A-string heaters
did not cycle on at the thermostat set point (59 °F) (Flight Problem STS-35-04).
The temperature while operating on the A heaters went as low a 52 °F (within
3 °F of fault-detection-annunciator limit) before switchover to the B heaters.
The B heaters functioned normally. Much of the mission was flown on the A
heaters to conserve power. Solar heating maintained the temperatures within
acceptable limits. The lowest temperature noted while operating on the A
heaters was approximately 47 °F for the fuel and 50 °F for the oxidizer.
During flight day 3 activities, vernier thruster R5D failed off (Flight Problem
STS-35-20). Analysis of the chamber pressure traces indicated that helium
ingestion had occurred. The thruster was reselected and hot fired until no
trace of gas could be seen (five pulses). Analysis is continuing to determine
the source of the helium.
Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem
The performance of the OMS was very satisfactory with no anomalies noted. Two
OMS maneuvers were performed (OMS-2 and deorbit), with a total firing duration
of 410.5 seconds and a differential velocity of 662.3 ft/sec. A total of
11,013 ib of oxidizer and 6521 ib of fuel was used from the OMS tanks of which
over 7 percent was used by the RCS during interconnect operations. The ongoing
problem of the right aft gauge going off-scale high and causing discrepant aft
and total readings recurred, but the discrepant readings did not affect mission
operations.
The OMS oxidizer high-point bleed line (aft) system A and B heater thermostats
were intermittently cycling and dithering. The A thermostat cycled between
56 °F and 95 °F, and the B thermostat cycled between 57 °F and 77 °F. The A
thermostat dithered between 61 °F and 65 °F, and the B thermostat dithered at a
steady 62 °F. These conditions did not impact mission operations, as dithering
thermostats are not considered failed. Also, both systems have an
over-temperature thermostat in series for redundancy; therefore, no action will
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be taken until the Orbiter undergoes major modifications after its next flight.
Following the deorbit maneuver, the oxidizer low-level warning indicated about
4.5 percent remaining, which was slightly below estimates. Evaluation showed
this condition to be within normal tolerances because of the inaccuracies in the
amount of oxidizer used during interconnect operations with the RCS.
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution Subsystem
The performance of the power reactant storage and distribution (PRSD) subsystem
was nominal, with no anomalous operation noted. The Orbiter was configured with
five cryogenic tank sets for this long-duration mission. A total of 2679 lb of
oxygen and 321 lb of hydrogen was consumed during the mission, with 130 lb of
oxygen consumed by the crew included in that total. Reactants remaining at
touchdown were adequate to support a mission extension of 72 hours.
At 341:06:40 G.m.t., PRSD oxygen tank 5 quantity dropped below 8 percent. The
tank heater was turned off 2 hours 10 minutes later, at which time the quantity
had dropped to 6 percent. The Shuttle Operational Data Book states a constraint
that requires that any individual oxygen tank heaters be turned off when
quantity in that tank reaches 8 percent to avoid overpressurizing the tank.
This condition did not impact the mission.
Fuel Cell Powerplant Subsystem
The fuel cell powerplant subsystem operations were nominal, meeting all
electrical requirements for the 9-day scientific mission. The total energy
produced during the 214-hour mission was 3606 kwh with the average power level
at 16.8 kW. A total of 2870 lb of water was the by-product of this power
generation which consumed 2549 lb of oxygen and 321 lb of hydrogen. The average
total Orbiter electrical power was 16.8 kW and 540 A. The three fuel cells each
operated in excess of 256 hours in support of the STS-35 mission.
At the end of a manual purge of fuel cell 3, the water relief nozzle and relief
line heaters were deactivated. A fault message alerted the crew to reactivate
the heaters, thereby preventing catastrophic damage to the fuel cells, should
the primary or secondary water path become blocked or if freeze-up of the water
relief had taken place.
The fuel cell 3 hydrogen flow meter continued to read off-scale high as on
previous missions.
Auxiliary Power Unit Subsystem
The APU subsystem performance was satisfactory with one anomaly identified
during the mission, and that anomaly did not impact mission operations. The
following table shows the cumulative run time and fuel consumption of each APU
during the mission.
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APU 1 APU 2 APU 3
Flight phase Time, Fuel Time, Fuel Time, Fuel
mln:sec consumption,min:sec consumption,mln:sec consumption,
ib ib ib
Ascent 18:11 45 18:12 48 18:12 51
FCS checkout 5:54 14
Entry 01:25:46 159 59:09 121 59:09 124
Total a 01:43:57 204 01:23:15 183 01:17:21 175
Note:
a A total of 15 minutesII secondsof APU operationoccurredafter
landing.
The APU 2 gas-generatorbed temperature(V46TO222A)exhibiteda slow response
when the APU was startedfor FCS checkout,requiringabout 50 secondsto reach
500 °F (off-scalehigh) insteadof the nominal12 to 14 seconds(FlightProblem
STS-35-11a). This anomalydid not affect the mission. The gas generator
injectorstem temperaturereactednominallyduring the startup,and no anomalous
conditionswere noted in the gas generatorchamberpressure. This APU was
removedduring turnaroundactivities,as previouslyplanned,and troubleshooting
will be performed.
Three other problemswere noted during the missionand their significancedid
not warrant the declarationof an anomaly. The APU 2 lubricationoll outlet
pressurewas higher than normalduring ascent,FCS checkout,and entry,
averaging90 to 100 psla insteadof 40 to 50 psla. This is indicativeof wax in
the lubricationoil system that resultswhen hydrazinemixes with lubrication
oil. The pressuresreturnedto normalduring each periodwhen the lubrication
outlet temperaturereached200 to 225 °F. Also, APU 2 fuel tank isolationvalve
B experiencedtransientopen indicationswhen the valve was actuallyclosed.
This was a known conditionand had been acceptedto fly as is prior to the
flight. Additionally,the APU 2 injectortemperaturewas biased approximately
50 °F higher than the gas generatorbed temperatureat 336:14:00G.m.t. The two
temperaturesshould be approximatelythe same. The same conditionoccurredon
the last flightof this vehicle,and the thermaljunctionwas replacedfollowing
the STS-32 mission. This problemdid not impact the mission.
Hydraulics/WaterSpray Boiler Subsystem
The hydraulics/waterspray boiler (WSB) subsystemoperatedsatisfactorily
throughoutthe missionand one anomalywas identified. Additionally,two minor
problemswere also noted. During prelaunchoperations,all threeWSB "OK"
indicationswere continuouslypresent. No LCC violationswere observed.
WSB spraying for APU 2 lubricationoil coolingbegan about 2 minutesafter main
enginecutoff (MECO),as was expected. WSB sprayingfor APU 2 coolingwas not
requiredbecause the lubricationoil temperaturenever exceeded250 °F. High
gearboxoil pressureon APU 2 (40 to 50 psid from APU 1 and APU 3) during the
Ii
prelaunch period indicated wax/crystal contamination due to hydrazine leakage
into the gearbox. The wax/crystal condition resulted in lower lubrication oil
temperatures on APU 2 during ascent and probable contamination of WSB 2 (Flight
Problem STS-35-19). WSB spraying for APU 3 lubrication oil cooling was not
evident until about 12 minutes after lift-off when the lubrication oil
temperature had reached 277 °F. Analysis showed that the lubrication oil
temperature had exceeded the maximum WSB specification of 275 °F for 7 seconds.
During entry, WSB 3 experienced a minor over-cooling of the lubrication oil.
Analysis to determine the cause of these conditions continues.
PTrotechnics SubsTstem
The pyrotechnics subsystem operated nominally throughout the mission.
Environmental Control and Life Support SubsTstem
The atmospheric revitalization system performed nominally throughout the
mission. After the failure of data display system 2 created a burning odor in
the cabin, the combustible products analyzer (CPA) was unstowed and high levels
of carbon monoxide were detected in the cabin. The carbon monoxide absorber
cartridge (lithium hydroxide canister filled with platinum and charcoal) was
installed in the cabin loop for 4 hours after which the carbon monoxide levels
should have been reduced below Shuttle maximum allowable concentration (SMAC);
however, the CPA failed to record a decrease in carbon monoxide. The CPA was
purged with pure oxygen and still showed a carbon monoxide concentration;
therefore, analysis showed that the CPA-measured levels of carbon monoxide were
invalid.
During the redundant component checkout, a small amount of water was reported
around humidity separator B just after switching to A. The water was allowed to
evaporate and humidity separator A performed nominally for the rest of the
mission. Based on the increased quantity in the waste water tank and no visual
inspection of the separator, the humidity separators could not be verified to
have carried over water. This condition may have been caused by condensation or
residual water from humidity separator B after shutdown. This free water did
not impact the mission, and the humidity separators performance will be verified
during normal turnaround activities. The pressure control system hardware
parameters all remained within nominal ranges throughout the mission.
All active thermal control system components operated nominally during the
mission. The flash evaporator system (FES) was used to perform all supply water
dumps as required by the payload. Proper payload cooling was provided for the
on-orbit operation, and radiator cooling did not require the deployment of the
radiators. The freon coolant loop 1 flowrate was degraded as predicted prior to
flight, a condition that did not affect the flight.
A flash evaporator system (FES) supply water dump was completed satisfactorily.
At the beginning of the dump, which lasted approximately ii hours, the tank
quantity was approximately 92.5 percent. At the end of the dump, the tank
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quantity was approximately 4.3 percent. The FES dump ensured that at the end of
flight day 9, a total of 620 lb of water would be available for cooling during
entry.
The supply water management system performed nominally throughout the mission.
Supply water was managed by dumping water through the flash evaporator system.
However, the waste water system dump performance was not fully satisfactory.
The waste water system collected water satisfactorily and at a rate 26 percent
greater than the level nominally predicted. Three successful water dumps were
performed, but the dump rate continually degraded from 1.73 percent per minute
to 1.12 percent per minute. During the fourth waste water dump, the dump rate
continued to degrade and reached a level as low as 0.26 percent per minute, when
the dump was stopped to prevent icing of the dump nozzle. A cabin air purge of
the line was unsuccessful. Following the purge, an attempt was made to clear the
waste water dump line and nozzle using the in-flight maintenance (IFM) hose,
which was connected to the 30-psi nitrogen source from the pressure control
system and the contingency water cross-tie waste quick disconnect (OD), but the
line and nozzle became completely blocked (Flight Problem STS-35-05). As a
result, the contingency water collection bag was filled with waste water and the
waste water tank quantity was reduced to 10.4 percent at approximately 6 days
and 9 hours elapsed time. Again at approximately 7 day 9 hours elapsed time,
the waste water was transferred from the tank to 15 female urine absorption
systems (UAS's). This transfer gained enough ullage in the waste tank to allow
the crew to return to using the waste collection system for a nominal 10-day
f- end-of-mission. Another attempt was made with nitrogen from the 30-psi source
to clear the line, and little or no flow was obtained. Additional contingency
methods of transferring waste water were available, if the mission had been
extended for one day.
The waste collection system performed nominally throughout the mission. In
accordance with Development Test Objective (DTO) 329, the improved waste
collectionsystemthatwas flownfor thefirsttimewas evaluated.The crew
reported that the system worked well.
SmokeDetectionand FireSuppression
The smoke detection system operated nominally and the fire suppression system
was not required. Burning-wire type odors from the payload data display systems
were reported by the crew on three occasions; however, no detectable
thermal degradation products were indicated by the smoke detection subsystem.
Airlock Support System
The airlock support system was not used as no extravehicular activities were
required or performed. The airlock was used for stowage during the mission.
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Avionics and Software Subsystem
The performance of the integrated guidance, navigation and control subsystem was
nominal throughout the mission with no anomalies identified. The FCS was used
to perform DTO 242, an entry aerodynamic control surfaces test, which was
completed with nominal FCS performance.
All three inertial measurement units (IMU's) performed nominally during the
prelaunch, ascent, on-orbit, and entry phases of the mission. The star trackers
performed nominally; however, the -Z star tracker exhibited a self-test failure
on the first two attempts after power up because of star position errors of
1.10 degree in the horizontal position and 0.07 degree in the vertical position
(Plight Problem STS-35-10). These errors were only observed on the first two
software passes. Numerous subsequent self-tests were performed with nominal
results.
The performanceof the data processingsystem/flightsoftwarewas satisfactory.
One data entry unit keyboardchannelmiscomparewas noted at landingand the
data are being analyzedto determinethe cause of this condition. At 336:16:41
G.m.t., the aft data displayunit 3 (DDU 3) was commandedon for the -Z crew
opticalalignmentsight (COAS)calibration,and the downlinkedstatus of the
three power suppliesshowed the statusof power supplyB as off while the status
of power suppliesA and C indicatedon. Cyclingthe aft flightcontrollerpower
switch cleared the failureindication. This problemdid not impact the mission.
Data analysisshowed that the electricalpower distributionand control
subsystemperformednominallythroughoutthe missionwith nominalvoltagesand
currentsignatures,and no specificationlimitsviolated. One potential
electricalproblemconcerningthe pilot'sseat was noted during prelaunch
operations (Flight Problem STS-35-23). The seat would not move downward when
commanded,and the initialanalysisindicatesa stuck switch problemrather than
a switch failure.
The displays and controls subsystem performed nominally.
Communications and Tracking Subsystem
The communications and tracking subsystem performance was acceptable with eight
anomalies and one problem identified, none of which caused a significant impact
on the mission. The text and graphics system (TAGS) malfunctioned three times
between 337:12:20 and 339:13:14 G.m.t. (Flight Problem STS-35-02). Despite the
implementation of a 45-minute minimum warm-up time after the second jam, the
crew reported that the TAGS had jammed a third time. While the crew was
performing the malfunction procedure, the modified forceps tool that was
fabricated for use on TAGS paper jams was broken (Flight Problem STS-35-03). No
workarounds appeared to be feasible, and attempts to repair the TAGS were
discontinued. These problem did not impact the mission.
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The Ku-band system also failed a self-test. This deployed assembly (serial
number 106) has a history of self-test failures; however, system performance was
not affected and the condition did not impact the mission.
At approximately 336:18:00 G.m.t., the crew reported that two headsets and one
crew remote unit were inoperative (Flight Problem STS-35-06). Additional
headsets were available, and consequently, these failures did not impact the
mission.
Three closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras exhibited failure conditions
during the mission. The crew reported that CCTV camera B had no picture and
ground commands to this camera produced the same results (Flight Problem
STS-35-7a). Camera B was turned off for the remainder of the mission. CCTV
camera C showed a convex black area at the top of the screen, a concave black
area at the bottom of the screen, and a black-and-white picture in the center
(Flight Problem STS-35-7b). Cycling power did not clear this problem that was
apparently caused by a sticking color wheel. CCTV camera D had an intermittent
problem in that when powered up, only "snow" appeared on the screen (Flight
Problem STS-35-7c). The camera was powered up later in the mission and operated
properly.
The S-band upper left antenna was linked to many of the S-band Tracking and Data
Relay Satellite (TDRS) forward link dropouts (Flight Problem STS-35-13). The
_-_ S-band reflected power changed with time (from 1 to 5 watts) during a pass using
the upper left antenna. Numerous bad forward link passes coincided with the use
of the upper left antenna. Performance of the lower right S-band antenna was
also erratic. These problems did not impact the mission. Also, the downlink on
air-to-ground 2 was noisy during most of the mission (Flight Problem STS-35-15).
The noise disappeared when operating on network signal processor (NSP) I and was
only present when operating on NSP 2.
Operational Instrumentation Subsystem
The operational instrumentation (01) subsystem performed satisfactorily with
three minor anomalies. Data could not be dumped from track 2 of the operations
(OPS) recorder 1 (Flight Problem STS-35-01). Data were lost from 337:09:24 to
337:09:35 G.m.t., and track 2 was not used for the remainder of the mission.
Also, data from track 5 of OPS recorder 2 were degraded when dumped in both
directions (Flight Problem STS-35-08). Data were also not recorded on this
track for the remainder of the mission.
At 339:19:18 G.m.t., the payload recorder dumps at 4:1 and 2:1 were degraded
(Flight Problem STS-35-09). As the mission progressed, data dumped at I:i were
also degraded. All three of these recorders have the same manufacturer and have
been in use since 1983 or 1984. The symptoms observed are indicative of the
early stages of head wear as opposed to tape life.
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Structures and Mechanical Subsystems
The structures and mechanical functions were nominal during the mission. The
rlght-hand aft separation hole plugger did not fully extend (Flight Problem
STS-35-21). One of the two boosters was jammed between the plugger and the rim
of the hole. The other booster was missing.
The right-hand stop bolt on the ET forward structural attachment assembly was
bent (Flight Problem STS-35-22). This deformation was similar in magnitude to
the deformation observed on STS-38.
The landing and deceleration subsystem performance was nominal with main gear
touchdown occurring at 345:05:54:08 G.m.t., at a ground speed of 207.9 knots.
Sink rate at main gear touchdown was approximately 1.0 ft/sec. The nose landing
gear touchdown occurred at 345:05:54:20 G.m.t., at a ground of 169.5 knots and a
pitch rate of 3.40 deg/sec. Braking was initiated 11.6 seconds later at a
ground speed of 134.5 knots with wheels stop occurring 34.3 seconds after brake
initiation. Rollout distance was 10,447 feet. Brake energies were
32.41 million ft-lb for the left-hand outboard wheel, 31.04 million ft-lb for
the left-hand inboard wheel, 29.70 million ft-lb for the right-hand inboard
wheel, and 32.53 million ft-lb for the right-hand outboard wheel. The vehicle
weight at landing was 225,329.2 lb.
Aerodynamics
The entry aerodynamics were nominal with the control surfaces responding as
expected. Also, the angle of attack was as expected. DTO 242 (part 3) was
performed during entry. This DTO required eight programmed test inputs (PTI's)
including one manual body flap maneuver. Initial analysis indicates that all
maneuvers appeared to be nominal.
Thermal Control Subsystem
The thermal control (heater) subsystem operated nominally except for the left
RCS drain panel system A heater, which operated nominally for only one cycle
(Flight Problem STS-35-04). Orbiter structural and component temperatures were
maintained within acceptable limits throughout the flight. The temperature of
the Viton window seals is estimated to have been no colder than -45 °F. In
addition, eight dithering thermostats were identified during the mission. None
of these require replacement prior to the next flight. Also, the left OMS
oxidizer high-point bleed line system A and B heater control thermostats
exhibited periods of nominal cycling as well as periods of dithering.
Thermal Interfaces and Aerothermodynamics
The prelaunch thermal interfaces temperatures were all within design limits.
Also, the ET/Orbiter umbilical cavity electronic connector temperatures were
nominal. Preliminary analysis indicates that ascent heating was nominal and
that all Orbiter/SSME hydraulic interface temperatures were within interface
control documentation limits.
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The aerothermodynamics during entry were satisfactory with acreage heating
nominal. The local heating was nominal based on postflight inspection results.
Thermal Protection SubsTstem
The thermal protection subsystem (TPS) performance was nominal based on
structural temperature responses and some tile surface temperature measurements.
The overall boundary layer transition from laminar flow to turbulent flow was
nominal, occurring between 1210 and 1215 seconds after entry interface.
The postflight inspection revealed the TPS to be in good to excellent condition
with minimal impact damage, but with two large surface-damage areas evident in
the rlght-hand chine. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 147 hits, of
which 17 had a major dimension of 1-1nch or greater. This total does not include
the i00 hits on the base heat shield. The lower surface had 132 hits, of which
15 had a major dimension of 1-inch or greater. A comparison of these numbers to
statistics from 24 previous flights of similar configuration indicates the total
number of hits on the lower surface was average. A cluster of 45 hits (six
larger than 1 inch) occurred just aft and inboard of the liquid hydrogen
ET/Orbiter umbilical opening.
Overall, all reusable carbon carbon (RCC) parts appeared nominal. The OV-102
_-_ chin panel recorded its first flight. Inspection of the panel revealed surface
bubbling of the "A" enhancement coating applied on the RCC surface. The chin
panel is acceptable for flight in the as-is condition. The nose landing gear
door TPS was in good condition with only one loose patch on the Nicalon
sacrificial thermal barrier and small breaches on both sides. Indications of
potential flow paths and blanket damage were evident under the forward ET
forward attach RCC. The left-hand main landing gear door forward outboard tile
and adjacent structure tile had significant edge damage. Breaching of the
outboard and aft thermal barrier was evident on both doors. The ET door thermal
barriers were in good condition. The elevon cove TPS was in good condition with
no evidence of outgassing or gap filler damage. The elevon-elevon gap tiles
were in good condition, with no breached gap fillers. There was missing
coating and tile material on the right-hand wing tip, aft of RCC panel 22.
Overall, the upper surface TPS and OMS pods were nominal, with typical upper
wing surface white-tile damage. One of these sites exhibited significant
thermal erosion (approximately 3/4 inch in depth) and melting of the adjacent
tile coating material.
The largest lower surface damage site was located on the right-hand chine,
affected four tiles, and had a maximum depth of 1/4 inch.
No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels, tires, or brakes.
Material loss from the main landing gear tires was average for a concrete runway
landing.
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Damage to the base heat shield tiles was less than average (approximately I00
sites). The body flap upper surface tiles suffered more damage than usual with
several damage sites exhibiting significant depth. All three main engine
closeout blankets had localized areas of peeled, frayed, and/or missing
material.
During the postflight inspection, a piece of environmental seal material,
approximately 24 inches long, was observed hanging from the expansion joint
between the first and second sections of the right-hand payload bay door (Flight
Problem STS-35-16).
An impact crater, about 0.15 inch in diameter, was found in window 1 (Flight
Problem STS-35-18). Orbiter windows 3 and 4 were moderately hazed with minor
streaking, and windows 2 and 5 were lightly hazed.
FLIGHT CREW EQUIPMENT
All flight crew equipment functioned nominally, except the TAGS unjamming tool.
The middeck locker-sized manual trash compactor was evaluated for DTO 634. The
crew used the trash compactor daily and stated that the device worked very well.
While the crew was attempting to remove a paper jam from the TAGS, the modified
forceps tool that was designed to be used for paper removal broke (Flight
Problem STS-35-03). The crew reported that a weld spot at the head of the tool
had failed and that the jaws were separated from the shaft. The crew was
unsuccessful in an attempt at reattaching the head to the shaft using the crimp
tool from the pin kit.
At 349:09:52 G.m.t., while using the personal hygiene station hose assembly as a
contingency in-flight maintenance hose to flow waste water, the crew reported
that the hose became clogged and would not flow water. The crew stated that
"gray flakes" were in the water. The valve and possibly the quick disconnect
were contaminated and clogged.
During prelaunch adjustment of the pilot's seat, the astronaut support personnel
reported that the seat could not be adjusted downward (Plight Problem
STS-35-23). The seat was acceptable for flight because no downward movement was
anticipated during dynamic flight, and the crew could manually adjust the seat
while on orbit, if necessary.
PHOTOGRAPHIC AND TELEVISION ANALYSIS
On launch day, 25 videos were screened, and no anomalies were noted. Cloud
coverage did obstruct the view of the vehicle from several of the tracking
cameras. Review of over 60 films was also completed and no anomalies were
noted. Because of the night launch, no Castglance film of the SRB recovery was
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made. In some cases, exposure problems resulting from the night launch and
cloud cover hampered analysis and detection of possible debris or anomalies.
The crew also took eight pictures of the ET after separation. Analysis of these
pictures is continuing.
Video and films of landing on runway 22 at Edwards Air Force Base were also
reviewed, but because of the night landing, the quality of the pictures was not
up to the level seen on day landings. No anomalies were noted in any of these
landing videos or films.
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES AND DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES
Thirteen development test objectives (DTO's) were planned for this mission. Ten
of these DTO_s were accomplished; two DTO's were not attempted because the
initial conditions were not correct, and data collection problems prevented the
completion of a third DTO. The status of each DTO at the time of publication is
presented in the following subparagraphs.
DTO 236 - Ascent Wing Aerodynamic Distributed Loads - The data were successfully
collected for this DTO and are being analyzed by the sponsor.
DTO 242 - Entry Aerodynamic Control Surfaces Test - All eight programmed test
inputs (PTI's) were successfully completed. The data are being analyzed by the
sponsor.
DTO 301 - Ascent Structural Capability - The data were successfully collected
and are being analyzed by the sponsor.
DTO 307 - Entry Structural Capability - The data were successfully collected and
are being analyzed by the sponsor.
DTO 312 - ET Thermal Protection System Performance - This DTO was successfully
accomplished. Preliminary analysis of the ET photography taken by the crew
after ET separation reveals several white and black burn scars caused by SRB
separation. A number of divots and gouges were also detected. Digital
classification of the images is in work and will be included in the final report
for this DTO.
DTO 329 - Improved Waste Collection System Evaluation - The improved waste
collection system (IWCS) performed well as reported by the crew. The IWCS final
report is now in final preparation.
DTO 517 - Hot Nosewheel Steering - This DTO was not performed because it was
planned to be performed under daylight conditions.
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DTO 634 - In-FlightTrash Collection- The trash collectorwas used frequently
during the missionwith excellentresults. The final report on thisDTO is in
preparation.
DTO 805 - Crosswind Landing Performance - This DTO was not performed because of
the low crosswinds that were present at the time of landing.
DTO 901 - Orbiter Experiment Shuttle Infrared Leeside Temperature Sensing - This
DTO was not successfully completed because of data collection problems.
DT0 902 - Orbiter Experiment Shuttle Upper-Atmosphere Mass Spectrometer - Data
were collected and are being analyzed. The final report on this DTO will be
published in March 1991.
DTO 903 - Orbiter Experiment Shuttle Entry Air Data Sensor - The data were
collected for this DTO and are being analyzed.
DTO 911 - OrbiterExperimentAerothermod_namicInstrumentationPackage- The
data were collectedfor thisDTO and are being analyzed.
DETAILEDSUPPLEMENTARYOBJECTIVES
A total of Ii detailed supplementary objectives (DSO's) were planned for this
mission. Data were collected on all II DSO's and are currently being analyzed
by the investigators.
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TABLE I.- STS-35 SEQUENCEOF EVENTS
Event Description Actual time,
G.m.t.
APU activation APU-I GG chamber pressure 336:06:44:13.66
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 336:06:44:14.45
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 336:06:44:15.31
SRB HPU activation LH HPU system A start command 336:06:48:33.21
LH HPU system B start command 336:06:48:33.37
RH HPU system A start command 336:06:48:33.53
RH HPU system B start command 336:06:48:33.69
Main propulsion Engine 3 start command accepted 336:06:48:54.455
System start Engine 2 start command accepted 336:06:48:54.575
Engine I start command accepted 336:06:48:54.695
SRB ignition command SRB ignition command to SRB 336:06:49:01.0218
(lift-off)
Throttle up to Engine 3 command accepted 336:06:49:04.992
104 percent thrust Engine 2 command accepted 336:06:49:04.976
Engine 1 command accepted 336:06:49:04.969
Throttle down to Engine 3 command accepted 336:06:49:27.713
71 percent thrust Engine 2 command accepted 336:06:49:27.696
Engine I command accepted 336:06:49:27.689
Maximum dynamic Derived ascent dynamic 336:06:49:51
pressure (q) pressure
Throttle up to Engine 3 command accepted 336:06:50:04.195
104 percent thrust Engine 2 command accepted 336:06:50:04.177
Engine 1 command accepted 336:06:50:04.170
Both SRM's chamber LH SRM chamber pressure 336:06:51:01.26
pressure at 50 psi mid-range select
RH SRM chamber pressure 336:06:51:01.46
mid-range select
End SRM action LH SRM chamber pressure 336:06:51:O3.85
mid-range select
RH SRM chamber pressure 336:06:51:03.97
mid-range select
SRB separation command SRB separation command flag 336:06:51:07
SRB physical SRB physical separation
separation LH APU A turbine speed LOS* 336:06:51:06.78
LH APU B turbine speed LOS* 336:06:51:06.78
RH APU A turbine speed LOS* 336:06:51:06.78
RH APU B turbine speed LOS* 336:06:51:06.78
Throttle down for Engine 3 command accepted 336:06:56:33.457
3g acceleration Engine 2 command accepted 336:06:56:33.458
Engine 1 command accepted 336:06:56:33.460
3g acceleration Total load factor 336:06:56:34
MECO MECO command flag 336:06:57:33
MECO confirm flag 336:06:57:33
ET separation ET separation command flag 336:06:57:51
OMS-I ignition Left engine bi-prop valve N/A
position Not performed-
Right engine bi-prop valve direct insertion
position trajector7 flown
* = loss of signal
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TABLEI.- CONTINUED
Event Description Actual time,
G.m.t.
OMS-I cutoff Left engine bl-prop valve N/A
position Not performed -
Right engine bi-prop valve direct insertion
position trajectory flown
APU deactivation APU-IGG chamberpressure 336:07:02:25.38
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 336:07:02:26.63
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 336:07:02:27.09
OMS-2 ignition Leftenginebi-propvalve 336:07:29:25.8
position
Right engine bi-prop valve 336:07 :29:25.9
post t ion
0MS-2 cutoff Left engine bi-prop valve 336:07:32:25.4
position
Rightenginebi-propvalve 336:07:32:25.2
posit ion
Flight control
system checkout
APU start APU-2 GG chamber pressure 343:04:19:49.33
APU stop APU-2 GG chamber pressure 343:04:25:43.02
APU activation APU-I GG chamber pressure 345:04:43:32.57
for entry APU-2 GG chamber pressure 345:05:10:10.98
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 345:05:I0:II.75
Deorbit maneuver Left engine bi-prop valve 345:04:48:31.1
ignition position
Rightenginebi-propvalve 345:04:48:31.0
position
Deorbitmaneuver Leftenginebi-propvalve 345:04:52:21.9
cutoff position
Right engine bi-prop valve 345:04:52:22.0
position
Entry interface Current orbital altitude 345:05:23:07
(40Ok) above reference ellipsoid
Blackout Data locked at high sample No blackout
rate because of TDRS
Terminal area Major mode change (305) 345:05:47:56
energy management
Main landing gear LH MLG tire pressure 345:05:54:08
contact RH MLG tire pressure 345:05:54:08
Main landing gear LH MLG weight on wheels 345:05:54:10
weight on wheels RH MLG weight on wheels 345:05:54:09
Nose landing gear NLG tire pressure 345:05:54:20
Nose landing gear NLG WT on Wheels -I 345:05:54:21
weight on wheels
Wheels stop Velocity with respect to 345:05:55:07
runway
APU deactivation APU-I GG chamber pressure 345:06:09:18.36
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 345:06:09:19.78
APU-3GG chamberpressure 345:06:09:20.57
Note: Numerous data dropouts occurred, resulting in ranges being given for
measurements.
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TABLE If.- STS-35PROBLEMTRACKINGSI_q_ARY
Number Title Reference Con,nents
STS-35-01 OPS RecorderI Track 2 337:11:34G.m.t. OPS recorder1 track 2 unableto dump data. Loss of dun_ data from
Problem FIAR-BFCE-029-F022337:09:24G.m.t.to 337:09:35G.m.t. No operationalimpacton mission.
PR-INS-2-11-0669 Track 2 was not used for the remainderof the mission. Recorder
was removedat DFRC.
STS-35-02 TAGs Paper Jam 337:12:20:26G.m.t.TAGS jammedduringfirstpage of an uplinksequence. Additionaljam
PR CO_M-0159 occurredat 339:13:14G.m.t.,whilepage 3 of a messagesequencewas
passingthroughthe OHC developer. Duringtroubleshooting,the TAGS
unjaznalngtool also malfunctioned(STS-35-03).
STS-35-03 TAGS UnjaamingTool Broken339:13:29G.m.t. TAGS unjannningtool brokewhile attemptingto clear a jammedpiece of
(GFE) FIAR-BFCE-213-F006paper. The weld spot by the gripperteethbroke.
STS-35-04 Left RCS Drain Panel 337:22:39G.m.t. The left RCS drainpanel temperaturesensors,V42T2304Aand V42T2305A,
HeaterA Not On At Normal IM36RF02 indicatedthat the heaterdid not cycleat the expected59oF on the
Temperature IPR 40V-0004 left pod A heaters. The temperatureon the A heater went down to
52 °F, which was within3 oF of the faultdetectionannunciatorlimit,
beforeswitchingto the B heater.
STS-35-05 WasteWater I_ 339:12:30G.m.t. Waste waterdump data shows a gradualdegradationof the wastewater
Degradation IM35RF03 dump rate. Line completelyblockedon fourthwater dump. Waste tank
IPR 40V-0004 was off-loadedto CWC and UCD's/UAS's.The 30 psia nitrogenpurge
t-_ failedto removeblockage. Chitpreparedto troubleshootand repair
at KSC.
STS-35-06 Two headsetsinoperative 336:18:00G.m.t. The crew reportedthat t_o (2) headsetswere inoperative. C_e is
and one crew remoteunit FIAR BFCE 029-F024 physicallybroken,and the otherswillnot transmit. Also, one CRU
(CRU)failed FIAR BFCE 029-F025 wouldnot transmit.
FIAR BFCE 029-F026
STS-35-07 CCTV Problems:
a) CCTV CameraB Failed 340:13:23G.m.t. a) Crew reportedthat cameraB had no picture. Furthercommanding
(GFE) FIAR BFCE 029-F029 from the groundindicatedthe same result. Remove and replace
caBera.
b) CCTV CameraC Color 341:22:06G.m.t. b) Upon activation,cameraC imageshoweda convexblack area on top,
Wheel Sticking FIAR BFCE 029-F030 concaveblack area on bottom,and black and white picturein
center. Cyclingpower did not clearthe problem. Transient
anomaly. Removeand replacecamera.
c) CameraD - Intermittent344:03:16G.m.t. c) CameraD was poweredup and only "snow"appearedon the monitor.
PowerUp/Co,handing FIAR BFCE 029-F031 Later,cameraD was poweredback up and workedfine. Analysisof
Problem downlinkvideo revealedcameraD was phase shiftingthroughoutthe
entiremission. This failurewas the resultof a largephase
shift. No testingrequired. Removeand replacecameraD.
TABLE II.- STS-35PROBLEMTRACKINGSUMMARY
Number Title Reference Counts
STS-35-08 OPS Recorder2 Track 5 340:08:01G.m.t. Dump of OPS recorder2 track 5 was degradedwhen dumpedin either
DegradedQuality PR INS 2-11-0670 direction. Removedat DFRC.
FIAR BFCE 029-FO28
STS-35-09 PayloadRecorderTrack 5 339:19:18G.m.t. Initialpayloadrecorderdump at 4:1 and 2:1 were degraded. Recorder
DegradedQuality PR INS 2-11-0671 continuedto degradeduringthe mission,with 1:1 dumps also affected.
FIAR BFCE 029-FO27 Removedat DFRC.
STS-35-I0 -Z Star TrackerFailed 336:08:51G.m.t. -Z Star trackerfailedfirsttwo self-tests,but passedall subsequent
FirstTwo Self-Tests IM35RF04 self-tests. Star trackeroperatednominallythroughoutthe mission.
IPR 40V-0012 Possiblewarmupissue.
STS-35-11 APU 2 Gas GeneratorBed 343:04:20G.m.t. DuringAPU 2 startfor FCS checkout,the gas generatorbed temperature
TemperatureResponded IM35RF05 readinglaggedbehindnominalby 20 seconds. APU operatednominally.
Slowly Removeand ReplaceAPU 2.
STS-35-12 Integratedin STS-35-07b
STS-35-13 Upper Left S-bandAntenna 342:01:30G.m.t. Unexplainedforwardlink dropoutshave occurredwhileon upper left
PerformingPoorly IM35RF06 antenna. Reflectivepowerhas fluctuatedbetween1 and 5 watts during
IPR 40V-0013 thesedropouts. KSC troubleshootingplan in place.
bJ
_-, STS-35-14 Integratedin STS-35-07c
STS-35-15 Noiseon Air-to-Ground2 MissionDuration !Downlinkon air-to-ground2 was noisy duringmost of the mission.
While on NSP I, no noisewas present. Possiblyan NSP 2 problem.
STS-35-16 PayloadBay Door Found during A 24-inchpieceof the environmentalseal betweenpanels1 and 2 on the
EnvironmentalSeal Debond postflight rightpayloadbay door was foundloose on top of payloadbay door.
PR STR 2-11-2705
STS-35-17 WSB 3A OperationAbnormal Ascentand Entry Duringascent,spraycoolingdid not initiateuntilAPU 3 lubrication
DuringAscentand Entry oil returntemperaturereached280 °F (shouldbe no greaterthan
250 °F). Duringentry,slightovercoolingoccurred. Hot oil flush
required.
STS-35-18 WindowW-1 Has A 0.15-inchPostflight Postlandinginspectionrevealedan impact0.15-inchin diameterand
DiameterChip Inspection approximately0.005-inchdepth. "Spiderwebbing"type crackswere
PR STR 2-11-2703 emanatingfrom the impactPoint. Noted by crew on flightday 6.
Believedto have occurredin the atmosphere.Windowwill be removed
and replaced.
STS-35-19 WSB 2 Subjectedto Ascentand Entry Duringascentand entry,largeamountsof wax were noted in the AIR/2
AbnormallyLarge lubricationoil system. APU 2 will be removedand replaced;however,
Quantitiesof Wax WSB 2 requiresa hot-oilflush.
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TABLE II.- STS-35PROBLEMTRACKINGSUMMARY
Number Title Reference Con_ents
STS-35-20 RCS VernierThrusterR5D 339:19:03G.m.t. RedundancyManagement(RM)deselectedthrusterRSD becauseof low
FailedOff chamberpressure. The data indicatethe presence of heliumin the
crossfeedline. Similarto failureseen of STS-9 (STS-09-14).
STS-35-21 Right-HandAft Separation Found postflight The hole pluggerdid not completeits stroke, One of the two boosters
Hole Pluggerdid not fullyPR PYR 2-11-0091 was jammedin betweenthe pluggerand the rim of the hole. The other
extend boosterwas missing.
STS-35-22 Right-HandStop Bolt Bent Postflight Similarin magnitudeto the deformationseen after STS-38 scrub.
on ET ForwardStructural Inspection
AttachmentAssembly PR PYR 2-11-0092
STS-35-23 Pilot Seat Down Limit Prelaunch Pilot seat failedto allow the seat motorto drive down. Down limt
SwitchFailure DeferredPR switchremovedand replacedduringthe STS-35OPF flow as a result
FRCS-A0031 of STS-32-27. Troubleshootingplanned.
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